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RACE-CONSCIOUS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
BY TAX-EXEMPT 501(C)(3) CORPORATIONS
AFTER GRUTTER AND GRATZ
DAVID A. BRENNENt
INTRODUCTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
generally acts as a legal limit on the permissible bounds of
government action.1 Accordingly, public universities and other
government entities are constitutionally prohibited from
engaging in acts that violate equal protection of the laws.2 The
Supreme Court recently reinforced this point when it ruled, in
two related cases, that public universities may consider the race
of applicants when making admissions decisions, so long as an
applicant's race does not amount to a deciding factor when
granting admission. 3  By its very terms, the constitutional
t Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law; B.B.A, Florida Atlantic
University; J.D., L.L.M., University of Florida College of Law. This Article is based
on a presentation on April 4, 2003, at the St. John's University School of Law
Symposium entitled "Intersection of Race, Corporate Law, and Economic
Development." I would like to thank Leonard Baynes for organizing the Symposium.
I would also like to thank my fellow panelists for their valuable insights, including
Larry Cata Backer, Lisa Fairfax, Thomas Joo, Angel R. Oquendo, Steven Ramirez,
Cheryl Wade, and David Troutt. As always, thanks to my wife, Kimberly Brennen,
for her lasting support. Research for this Article was funded in part by a summer
research grant awarded by Mercer University School of Law.
I The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV., § 1. See generally The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (first case to analyze the Fourteenth
Amendment).
2 See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-46 (1879) ("The prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree
restrictions of State power.").
3 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (upholding the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action plan as consistent with the
equal protection clause); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2430 (2003)
(invalidating the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
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limitation imposed by the Equal Protection Clause only directly
applies to government entities, not private ones.4  Private
entities, however, are subject to other legal limits on the use of
race as a factor that are not themselves constitutional limits but
approximate to them.5 One of these pseudo-constitutional legal
limits for private actors-at least those that are tax-exempt
pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code-is
the tax law's public policy limitation.6 Hence, the Supreme
Court has ruled that a private university that discriminates
against black people is not entitled to section 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status. 7  This Article examines the impact of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning the permissible use
of race by public universities on the scope of the public policy
prohibition against racial preferences by private tax-exempt
entities.8
The ultimate concern here is the continued permissibility of
race-based affirmative action, in a very broad sense, in the tax-
exempt arena. Prior to the Supreme Court's clarification that
governmental use of race is permissible for racial diversity
purposes, federal courts were divided as to whether race could be
justified on any basis other than remedying specific acts of prior
discrimination. In light of this split in authority, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) indicated that it could take the position,
4 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337 (stating that states cannot discriminate based
on race under the Equal Protection Clause); Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427 (same).
5 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994) (stating that race, color, or previous
condition not permitted to affect right to vote); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000c-6, 2000d
(providing that members of class of similarly situated persons are entitled to equal
protection of laws and may not be denied admission to or prohibited from continuing
attendance at public college by reason of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
prohibition against exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of, and
discrimination under federally assisted programs on ground of race, color, or
national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (providing fair housing within constitutional
limitations).
6 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) ("Such an
examination reveals unmistakable evidence that, underlying all relevant parts of
the Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting
certain common-law standards of charity-namely, that an institution seeking tax-
exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public
policy.").
7 See id. at 605.
8 For additional discussion, see generally David A. Brennen, Charities and the
Constitution: Evaluating the Role of Constitutional Principles in Determining the
Scope of Tax Law's Public Policy Limitation for Charities, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 779
(2002) [hereinafter Charities and the Constitution].
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based on the direction of constitutional law, that race-based
affirmative action violates established public policy. Such a
position would effectively prohibit affirmative action by all
section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt institutions, which includes many
schools, hospitals, and other charitable entities. Thus, it is
important to resolve the impact of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions on private tax-exempt institutions that adopt
affirmative action policies aimed at benefiting blacks, Latinas
and Latinos, Native Americans, and other minorities.9 Although
the Supreme Court has outlined the types of race-based
affirmative action policies that may be used by public
universities when making admissions decisions, it remains to be
seen what impact the Court's decisions will have with respect to
private entities that have obtained or desire section 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status.
Part I of this Article examines how the Equal Protection
Clause limits the government's ability to engage in race-based
affirmative action. Part I focuses on how constitutional law
analysis has evolved in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. Part II
provides a brief description of tax law's public policy limitation.
This part shows how the IRS, though not required to do so, has
generally followed Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence when
applying the public policy limitation to race-based activity by
private tax exempt 501(c)(3) institutions. Part III discusses how
the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz will likely
impact the way in which the IRS interprets the public policy
limitation as a factor in determining the permissibility of race-
based affirmative action by tax exempt 501(c)(3) institutions.
Finally, this Article concludes that despite a contrary rule with
respect to public institutions, private 501(c)(3) tax exempt
institutions are not necessarily prohibited from using race as a
deciding factor when making important decisions about matters
such as admission to a private university.
9 Disputes may also arise in other contexts, as when private tax-exempt schools
require applicants to prove a particular lineage, for example, Native Hawaiian,
before admitting an otherwise qualified applicant. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Student
Sues for Admission to Schools for Hawaiians, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003, at A18.
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I. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE LIMITS ON THE USE OF RACE BY
PUBLIC ENTITIES: GRUTTER AND GRATZ
On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court decided two cases that
directly impact how public universities may consider the race of
an applicant for admission. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court
upheld the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative
action plan for admitting racial minorities as consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause. 10 In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court
struck down the University of Michigan's undergraduate
minority admissions program as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause.11 Both the law school and undergraduate
admissions programs at issue in these cases, albeit in different
ways, considered the race of each applicant. The law school
program used race as one of many factors in the admission
process, while the undergraduate school used race as a deciding
factor in many cases. Both of these Supreme Court decisions
will be pivotal in the realm of constitutional jurisprudence
because they outline the parameters of appropriate race-based
affirmative action by public universities and other government
actors. Specifically, the Court in Grutter and Gratz finally
answered a question that has divided federal courts of appeals
for many years: May the government ever use race as a factor
when making important decisions about matters like admission
to state colleges and universities? The Supreme Court's answer
to this question is yes, but only under certain conditions.
A. Equal Protection Analysis Before Grutter and Gratz
Prior to the Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz, federal
courts were split over the proper role race could play in
government affirmative action plans. As the following analysis
indicates, those courts that rejected the use of race in public
university admissions did so because either the asserted
rationale for using race or the manner in which race was used
did not comply with strict scrutiny. Thus, these courts
resoundingly rejected Justice Powell's assertion in his concurring
opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke that racial
diversity is a compelling government interest which may justify
10 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
11 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003).
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the use of race.' 2 On the other hand, those courts that accepted
the use of race embraced Justice Powell's view of the compelling
nature of racial diversity in education and concluded that racial
diversity is sufficiently compelling to satisfy the Equal
Protection Clause. They also recognized necessarily that
remedying prior acts of specific discrimination is not the only
compelling government interest for Equal Protection Clause
strict scrutiny purposes.
1. Circuits that Rejected the Use of Race
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz, both
rejected the idea that racial diversity is a compelling interest
that justifies the use of race in public university admissions,
albeit in different ways. The Fifth Circuit's rejection of racial
diversity in Hopwood v. Texas was explicit and played a major
part of the ultimate Court holding; however, the Eleventh
Circuit's rejection of racial diversity was less explicit. Although
the Eleventh Circuit appeared to make clear in Johnson that it
agreed with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Hopwood that racial
diversity is not a compelling government interest, the discussion
was technically dicta as it was unnecessary for the court's
holding. 13
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit held that it was a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause for a state to use race as a factor
when making admission decisions at public university law
schools. 14 Hopwood involved the Fifth Circuit's review of the
University of Texas Law School's admission process in which the
race of applicants was considered at various stages of the
application process in order to attain a diverse student body.
First, racial minority applicants needed lower grade point
average/Law School Admissions Test index scores than white
applicants in order to gain admission.15 Second, racial minority
applicants received more extensive file reviews than white
12 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314-15 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
13 Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2001).
14 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996). Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit, in Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161-62 (4th Cir. 1994), held that a
race-exclusive scholarship program offered by a state university violated the Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment.
15 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
applicants, which increased minority applicants' likelihood of
admission. 16  Finally, the law school maintained separate
waiting lists for racial minority applicants and white applicants,
again increasing the minority applicants' likelihood of
admission. 17 Four white applicants who were denied admission
to the University of Texas Law School sued the State of Texas,
claiming that the admissions process violated their rights under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Specifically, they claimed that the law school unconstitutionally
discriminated against them based solely on their race.18
The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas agreed with the
rejected white applicants and reversed the district court's
approval of the University of Texas Law School's admission
process. 19 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court explained that the
state law school's interests in attaining a diverse student body
and remedying effects of societal discrimination were not
compelling state interests for Equal Protection Clause
purposes. 20 The Fifth Circuit refused to adopt Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke as binding precedent that diversity is a
compelling state interest that justifies racial classifications. 2'
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit did not agree with the law school that
its attempt to remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination
by Texas's primary and secondary schools was compelling. 22
Instead, the Fifth Circuit noted that the only compelling interest
that would justify the state law school's use of race would be
"remedying past wrongs" by the University of Texas Law
School.23 Since the Fifth Circuit concluded that the law school
had not crafted its admission process for this purpose, the court
16 Id. at 937.
17 Id. at 938.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 934.
20 Id. at 944-46.
21 See id. at 945-45. The Fifth Circuit explained:
Within the general principles of the Fourteenth Amendment, the use of
race in admissions for diversity in higher education contradicts, rather
than furthers, the aims of equal protection. Diversity fosters, rather than
minimizes, the use of race. It treats minorities as a group, rather than as
individuals. It may further remedial purposes but, just as likely, may
promote improper racial stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility.
Id.
22 Id. at 948-55.
23 See id. at 945.
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held that the admission process violated the white applicants'
right to equal protection.
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson v.
Board of Regents held that the University of Georgia's use of race
in its admission process violated Equal Protection Clause
standards. 24 Although the University of Georgia's admission
process differed in some ways from that of the University of
Texas, the two processes were similar in that they both gave
minority applicants an advantage over white applicants. The
University of Georgia's admissions process also had three stages.
At the first stage, grades, test scores, and an index score which
was based on grades and test scores were considered
independent of race. 25  The public university automatically
admitted those students with a combination of grades and test
scores above a certain number. Applicants that failed to meet
the qualifications for automatic admission at the first stage
were moved into the second stage. At the second stage,
applicants with test scores below a certain level were
automatically rejected.26 For the remaining applicants at this
second stage, various factors were then used to calculate a so-
called TSI score for each applicant. 27 Among the factors used to
calculate the TSI score included the race of an applicant.
Applicants with TSI scores below a certain level were
automatically rejected, while those above a certain level were
automatically admitted. Those applicants whose TSI score fell
between these two levels moved to a third stage in the
admissions process which did not explicitly require the
consideration of the applicant's race. 28
Three rejected white applicants sued the University of
Georgia, claiming that the public university's admission process
unconstitutionally denied them equal protection based solely on
their race.29  The University of Georgia responded that
considering race was necessary in order to achieve the
compelling government interest of racial diversity in the
classroom. 30 Notably, the University of Georgia, unlike the
24 Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2001).
25 Id. at 1240.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1240-41.
29 Id. at 1237.
30 Id.
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University of Texas, did not allege remedying past
discrimination as a justification for its consideration of race.
Additionally, even though it applied strict scrutiny, the Eleventh
Circuit in Johnson refused to officially rule on the university's
claim that educational diversity was a compelling state
interest. 31  The court in Johnson refused to adopt Justice
Powell's position in Bakke that racial diversity is a compelling
government interest, but rather left the issue open for the
Supreme Court to resolve. 32  Instead, the court in Johnson
concluded that even if racial diversity was a compelling interest,
the university's means of obtaining that diversity-by using a
"rigid, mechanical approach to considering race" of applicants-
was not "narrowly tailored."3 3  The Court in Johnson also
concluded that the university's failure to allow for consideration
of a variety of non-race factors in its admissions process or to
consider any race-neutral alternatives contributed to the narrow
tailoring deficiency. 34
2. Circuits That Accepted the Use of Race
In contrast to the position taken by the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, other courts of appeals held that racial diversity was a
compelling government interest justifying the use of race by
public universities in admission processes. For example, in
Smith v. University of Washington, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit described the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Hopwood
as "flawed" to the extent that it refused to recognize the
compelling nature of racial diversity.35 Smith involved the Ninth
Circuit's review of the University of Washington's affirmative
action admission policy that took into account the race of
applicants as a factor in the decision-making process. 36 Smith
was one of several white applicants who challenged the
University of Washington's policy as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. The district court in Smith denied the
plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, which alleged that race
.31 Id.
32 Id. at 1244-45.
33 Id. at 1254-55.
34 Id. at 1254.
35 Smith v. Univ. of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
36 Id. at 1191.
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could not be used as a factor in public school admission
decisions,3 7 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of
summary judgment to the white plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit in
Smith explained that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke clearly
contemplated that a state school could have a compelling
interest in student body diversity that would justify the use of
race as an admission factor.3 8 In a direct reference to the Fifth
Circuit's conclusion to the contrary in Hopwood, the Ninth
Circuit explained: "We acknowledge that Hopwood v. Texas
decided to the contrary. The flaws in that decision, however,
stem from its failure to properly apply the teachings of Marks [v.
United States] .39
This split in authority that existed prior to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz demonstrated that while
it was clear that government invidious discrimination against
racial minorities always violated Equal Protection, it was
unclear whether benign race-based affirmative action necessarily
violated Equal Protection. One author explained the split as
follows:
Circuit courts uniformly interpret Bakke to hold that strict
scrutiny applies to both invidious discrimination and benign
affirmative action for racial minorities. Accordingly, both types
of racial preferences will be upheld if the government can show
that the preference is necessary to accomplish a compelling
interest. This standard effectively means that any racial
preference by government in favor of members of a racial
majority that disadvantage members of a racial minority
necessarily violates the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, no
modern day federal court has ever concluded that it was
necessary to discriminate against racial minorities in order to
accomplish a compelling government interest. On the other
hand, Equal Protection Clause strict scrutiny does not mean
that racial preferences in favor of racial minorities that
disadvantage racial majorities necessarily violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The Fifth Circuit's view is that it is never
necessary to favor a racial minority over a racial majority in
order to accomplish a compelling government interest. [Other]
[c]ircuits' views are that it may be necessary to make such
racial preferences in order to accomplish compelling
37 Id.
38 See id. at 1197.
39 Id. at 1200 n.9; see also Marks v. United States. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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government interests. This aspect of Equal Protection Clause
strict scrutiny is the central reason why Federal Circuit Courts
are divided on the issue of whether race may ever be a factor in
government affirmative action efforts. 40
Thus, prior to Grutter and Gratz, it was one's geographic
location-either in the Fifth Circuit or in the Ninth Circuit-that
determined whether race could be used as a factor in
government decision making. For states not located within one
of the circuits where the issue had been addressed, it was
uncertain what the proper rule was. Prior to Grutter and Gratz,
the answer was unclear for most of the country's public entities.
Thus, Equal Protection Clause constitutional law analysis was in
somewhat of a state of flux with regard to whether a government
could ever rely on race as a factor in making important decisions
until the Supreme Court decided Grutter and Gratz.
B. The Impact of Grutter and Gratz on Equal Protection
Analysis
The Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger4' and
Gratz v. Bollinger42 on Equal Protection constitutional analysis
are clear: race may be used as a factor by government decision
makers. Granted, the Court's decisions in these cases do not
permit the government's unbridled use of race in its decision-
making process. Indeed, the Court's differing conclusions with
respect to the law school case and the undergraduate case make
this point abundantly clear. The fact remains, however, that,
after these decisions, race is not necessarily discounted as an
inappropriate factor to consider in public university admissions.
1. The Law School Case: Grutter v. Bollinger
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court considered
whether the University of Michigan Law School's admission
policy, which explicitly considered the race of the applicant along
with other factors, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 43 The express purpose for this elite
public law school considering race was to achieve a racially
40 Charities and the Constitution, supra note 8, at 822.
41 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
42 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
43 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2331-32.
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diverse student body.44 The law school's policy, however, did not
use race as a deciding factor of admission. Instead, race, along
with other factors such as grades, test scores, and background,
was used in a flexible manner to judge the ability of the
applicant to contribute meaningfully to life at the law school.45
The thought was that such diversity would contribute
significantly to the educational experience of all law students.46
Thus, because of the admission policy, grades and test scores
alone did not determine admission. Indeed, just as "the highest
possible score [did] not guarantee admission [under the policy],"
a low score did not "automatically disqualify an applicant"
either.47
A white applicant, whose application for admission was
denied, challenged the law school's admission policy in federal
court claiming that as a result of the race-based admission
policy, the law school violated her right to equal protection. 48
The district court, determining that the law school's interest in
student body diversity was not a compelling governmental
interest and that its use of race was not narrowly tailored to
achieve diversity, concluded that "the [1]aw [s]chool's use of race
as a factor in admissions decisions was unlawful."49 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding "that Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke was binding precedent establishing
diversity as a compelling state interest" and that the law school's
use of race was narrowly tailored because race was merely a
"potential 'plus' factor" and not a deciding factor of admission. 50
The Supreme Court, citing Hopwood v. Texas and Smith v.
University of Washington, agreed to hear the Grutter case so as
to finally resolve the issue of "[w]hether diversity is a compelling
interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in
selecting applicants for admission to public universities." 51
At the outset of the opinion, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, expressly adopted Justice Powell's view of racial
diversity as expressed in his concurring opinion in Bakke.
44 Id. at 2332.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 2335.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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Justice O'Connor explained: "[W]e endorse Justice Powell's view
that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that
can justify the use of race in university admissions."52 Thus, the
remainder of the majority opinion was devoted to an
examination of whether the University of Michigan Law School's
plan actually complied with strict scrutiny under Equal
Protection Clause. On the question of racial diversity as the law
school's actual objective, the Court in Grutter explained that it
essentially deferred to the school's judgment as to how essential
racial diversity is to its educational mission.5 3 The Court noted
that the law school's objectives of achieving a "critical mass" of
minority students as opposed to a prescribed number or
percentage, preparing students for a diverse workforce, and
educating a more diverse group of potential leaders were all
strong indicators of the school's educational purposes. 54
The Court in Grutter also concluded that the law school's
admission policy was narrowly tailored because it used race "in a
flexible, nonmechanical way" and did not "insulate applicants
who belong[ed] to certain racial or ethnic groups from the
competition for admission."55 Indeed, the law school's admission
program did not amount to a quota system for minorities.
Instead, the law school's plan "permit[ted] consideration of race
as a 'plus' factor in any given case while still ensuring that each
candidate 'compete[d] with all other qualified applicants.' "56
The Court recognized that the law school's admissions process
was "highly individualized" and involved a "holistic review of
each applicant's file giving serious consideration to all the ways
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational
environment."57 Importantly, the Court determined that the law
school did not have a policy of automatic acceptance or rejection
based on race or any other factor for that matter. 58 The Court
also refused to hold that narrow tailoring required the use of any
available non-race alternatives, such as adopting a race-neutral
lottery-type system or de-emphasizing grades. 59 Instead, the law
52 Id. at 2337.
53 Id. at 2339.
54 Id. at 2329.
55 Id. at 2342 (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987)).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 2343.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2344-45.
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school's refusal to adopt such alternatives to considering race did
not diminish its compliance with the narrow tailoring aspect of
strict scrutiny if those alternatives would require a dramatic
drop in "the academic quality of all admitted students."60
2. The Undergraduate Case: Gratz v. Bollinger
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Grutter, it
also decided Gratz v. Bollinger, a case involving the
constitutionality of the University of Michigan's undergraduate
admission policy.61 Like the law school policy, the undergraduate
policy also used race as a factor in making admission decisions;
however, unlike the law school's admission policy the
undergraduate policy used race as a deciding factor, a practice
that the Supreme Court rejected as inconsistent with Equal
Protection. 62
In Gratz, two white applicants who were denied admission
into one of the University of Michigan's undergraduate colleges
sued the university claiming that their denial of admission
violated their constitutional rights to equal protection.63 The
undergraduate admission policy in Gratz required admissions
counselors to use university-wide, written guidelines in making
admission decisions that would "promote consistency in the
review of the large number of applications received."64  The
guidelines identified a number of factors counselors were
required to use in making admission decisions, which included
grades, test scores, school quality, curriculum strength,
geography, alumni relationships, leadership, and race.65 Upon
compiling these factors, admission counselors would convert the
factors for each applicant into a special "GPA 2" score. 66 The
counselors would then use guideline tables containing pre-
determined combinations of "GPA 2" scores and ACT/SAT scores
to decide whether to admit, reject, delay, or postpone an
applicant. 67 Different combinations of scores were used to make
60 Id. at 2345.
61 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003).
62 Id. at 2428, 2430.
63 Id. at 2417-18.
64 Id. at 2418.
65 Id. at 2418-19.
66 Id. at 2419.
67 Id.
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admissions decisions based on the race of the applicant.68 Both
white plaintiffs challenging the policy had score combinations
which rendered their applications postponed; whereas minority
applicants with the same score combinations would generally
have been automatically admitted. 69  The undergraduate
university later revised its admission policy by instituting a
selection index "under which every applicant from an
underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group was awarded
20 points," which was one-fifth of the points needed to gain
automatic admission.70
The university, again relying on Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Bakke, defended its use of race on the ground that it
was necessary to consider race in order to attain a diverse
undergraduate student body.71 Though the Court agreed that
racial diversity could justify the use of race in some cases, it
concluded that the University of Michigan's use of race in its
undergraduate admissions was not narrowly tailored to achieve
the interest asserted.7 2  The Court explained that the
undergraduate policy did not provide the "individualized
consideration" required for strict scrutiny because it
"automatically distribute[d] 20 points to every single [minority]
applicant" solely because of the applicant's race. 73  Further,
whereas Justice Powell's conception of an appropriate
affirmative action plan required that race not be a decisive
factor, the undergraduate policy "ha[d] the effect of making 'the
factor of race ... decisive'" for minority applicants. 74 The Court
in Gratz rejected the university's attempt to ameliorate the
decisive impact of race by flagging certain applications for
individualized review by a special admissions committee because
"such consideration [was] the exception and not the rule in the
operation" of the admissions program.7 5 Indeed, the special
committee reviewed only some of the applications. The Court
further rejected the university's claim that the administrative
difficulty of providing individualized review for each of its
68 Id. at 2419 n.7.
69 Id. at 2419.
70 Id. at 2420.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2427-28, 2430.
73 Id. at 2428.
74 Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
75 Id. at 2429.
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applicants warranted that the school's policy withstood strict
scrutiny, concluding instead that Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke did not allow for such exceptions.7 6
The Court's decisions in Grutter-that racial diversity
justifies the flexible use of race as one of many factors of
admissions-and Gratz-that racial diversity does not justify the
use of race as a deciding factor of admission-are very
instructive. These decisions finally clarify that government
actors can use race-based affirmative action policies in order to
achieve compelling government interests. Importantly, the
Court has confirmed that achieving racial diversity in the
classroom can be as compelling an interest as is remedying
specific acts of prior discrimination. Even though the Court has
sanctioned the use of race by government actors, however, it
cautions that racial policies must be flexible enough such that
race does not amount to a deciding factor. Thus, the Court
would likely invalidate a government policy that automatically
granted government benefits to a person solely because of that
individual's race. Conversely, the Court would likely uphold a
government policy that used race as one of many factors to
assess the unique qualities of an individual. While the ongoing
division among the federal courts on the issue of the permissible
use of race by government actors is now resolved, a related issue
still exists: What does this mean for non-government private
actors who are subject to tax law's public policy limitation? Does
the same demarcation between flexible use of race and using
race as a deciding factor apply?
III. TAX LAW LIMITS ON THE USE OF RACE BY PRIVATE ENTITIES:
THE PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATION
As discussed in Part I above, the Court has finally resolved
the issue of how and when government actors may take account
of race in their decisions. Government actors, however, do not
have a monopoly on important societal functions; private
educational institutions coexist with state universities. Many, if
not most, of these private universities and schools are organized
as section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt institutions under the Internal
Revenue Code. Additionally, many of these private educational
institutions receive direct federal funding and are therefore
76 Id. at 2430.
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subject to federal civil rights laws.77 The Supreme Court has
interpreted federal civil rights laws as essentially imposing the
same restrictions on private activity as the Equal Protection
Clause imposes on government activity when it comes to racial
distinctions. 78  It follows that even though these private
recipients of federal funds are not technically government actors,
they are still subject to the same restrictions imposed by the
Equal Protection Clause on government institutions. 79
Private non-governmental institutions often choose not to
accept federal funds in order to avoid application of federal civil
rights laws. For example, Bob Jones University, formerly a
section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt institution, stopped accepting all
direct federal funds years ago when it appeared that its racially
discriminatory policies might cause it to violate federal civil
rights laws.80 Later, when the Supreme Court held that Bob
Jones University could not operate as a section 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt institution while discriminating against African-
Americans, Bob Jones University chose to relinquish its tax-
exempt status rather than change its racially discriminatory
policies.81 Additionally, a private school in Hawaii that has
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status recently decided to stop accepting
federal funds so that it too could avoid violation of federal civil
rights laws that prohibit discrimination by recipients of federal
financial assistance.8 2 Interestingly, two days after the Court
issued its decisions in Grutter and Gratz, a student who was
77 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) ("No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." (emphasis added)).
78 See David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice and Civil Rights:
Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws To Apply to Private Charities, 2001 BYU
L. REV. 167, 179-81 (2001) (illustrating that federal civil rights statutes, such as
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibit private actors from discriminating
based on race, color, or national origin).
79 See id. at 171-72, 192-93.
80 See Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 600 (D. S.C. 1974), aff'd,
529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that Bob Jones University refuses to accept
any government funds or grants because it "believe[s] such acceptance would cause
the surrender of its religious principles and infringe upon its right to operate in
harmony with such principles").
81 See id. The Court agreed with the Internal Revenue Service that Bob Jones
University's tax-exempt status should be denied because the University maintained
racially discriminatory policies. Id. at 605.
82 See generally Liptak, supra note 9, at A18 (explaining how the school is
funded by way of a trust created in 1884).
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denied admission by the private tax-exempt school in Hawaii
sued the school, claiming that the school denied him admission
solely because of his lineage in violation of federal civil rights
laws.8 3  For private institutions that do not receive federal
financial assistance and are tax-exempt via section 501(c)(3), the
only legal restriction on their use of race is tax law's public policy
limitation.
A. Tax Law's Public Policy Limitation
Charities are entities exempt from the federal income tax, as
described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.8 4
The guiding principle for these special tax-exempt entities, at
least when it comes to race-conscious decisions and similar
concerns, is the public policy limitation as outlined by the
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States.85 In
Bob Jones University, the Supreme Court revoked the tax-
exempt status of a charity-in that case a private tax-exempt
religious university-that discriminated against black people in
making admissions decisions.8 6 In determining that there was a
"fundamental public policy" against such discrimination, the
Court in Bob Jones University analyzed decisions by various
federal authorities, which had unanimously concluded that
discrimination against black people in public education is
unconstitutional and against public policy.8 7 Accordingly, the
Court in Bob Jones University upheld the IRS's revocation of Bob
Jones University's section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status by
proclaiming that tax-exempt charities cannot violate established
public policy.88
Since its decision in Bob Jones University, the Supreme
Court has never again addressed the issue of whether particular
action by a charity violates the public policy limitation. In fact,
other than in the obvious case of racial discrimination against
83 See id.
84 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
85 461 U.S. 574 (1983). See also Jones et al., THE TAX LAW OF CHARITIES AND
OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, QUESTIONS AND ACTIVITIES,
11-16 (West Publications 2093).
86 Id. at 605.
87 Id. at 592-96.
88 See David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination,
Public Policy, and "Charity" in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389,
403 (2000).
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black people,89 the IRS has never used the public policy
limitation as a basis for revoking or denying tax-exempt
charitable status. However, the IRS has indicated a willingness
to consider the prospect of using the public policy limitation in
contexts other than racial discrimination against black people.
Thus, when a charity uses racial preferences, not against black
people, but in the context of a broader policy aimed at helping
blacks and other minorities, the IRS has implicitly asked
whether such race-conscious affirmative action violates
"established public policy?" 90
B. Application of the Public Policy Limitation to Race-Conscious
Affirmative Action Before Grutter and Gratz
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Grutter and
Gratz, the IRS essentially concluded that race-conscious
affirmative action by private, tax-exempt universities and other
charities did not violate the public policy limitation. The IRS
appears to have based this position on the fact that race-
conscious affirmative action by government is not always
unconstitutional.9 1  The most telling example of the IRS's
position with regard to this issue is a statement made in a 1999
Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM) issued to a private, tax-
exempt trust, commonly referred to as the Bishop Estate. 92 The
trust involved in the Bishop Estate TAM operated a school that
only admitted students of Hawaiian ancestry. The IRS
concluded that the trust did not violate tax law's public policy
limitation by denying admission to non-native Hawaiians. 93
However, the TAM went on to advise the trust that it "should
consider requesting a private letter ruling on whether the [then
89 See, e.g., Calhoun Acad. v. Comm'r., 94 T.C. 284, 305 (1990) ("After a
comprehensive review of the administrative record, we find that petitioner has not
carried its burden to show that it operates in good faith in accordance with a
racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students .... Accordingly, petitioner has not
shown that [the service] was erroneous in denying petitioner tax-exempt status
under section 501(c)(3)."); see also Va. Educ. Fund v. Comm'r., 85 T.C. 753, 746-47
(1985) (discussing acceptable standards of proof for a charity to show that it has not
violated non-discrimination requirements).
90 See generally Charities and the Constitution, supra note 39.
91 See id; see also Tech. Adv. Mem. (issued to the Kamehameha Schools/Bernice
Pauahi Bishop Estate) (unpublished) (Feb. 4, 1999) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter "Bishop Estate TAM"].
92 See Bishop Estate TAM, supra note 90.
93 See id.
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pending Supreme Court] decision [in Rice v. Cayetano] would
have any effect on the analysis."94  Rice concerned the
constitutionality, under the Fifteenth Amendment, of Hawaii's
practice of denying non-native Hawaiians the fundamental right
to vote for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. 95
In suggesting that the pending Rice case was relevant to its
decision on the permissibility of the trust's Hawaiians-only
policy in the 1999 TAM, the IRS relied on "several Supreme
Court opinions addressing the constitutional challenges to
governmental actions under the Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth [and] Fifth Amendment[s]. '"96 The Supreme Court
opinions identified in the 1999 TAM and relied upon by the IRS
generally recognized that race-conscious affirmative action by
government was permissible as long as government had a
compelling interest and the consideration of race was necessary
to accomplish that interest. 97 After these pre-Grutter and pre-
Gratz Supreme Court cases were decided, however, some federal
circuit courts decided that race should never be considered in the
context of remedial affirmative action.98 Other courts decided
that it may be necessary, at times, to consider race in this
context.99 Thus, in contrast to the time the Court decided Bob
Jones University, when there was a uniform view that racial
discrimination against black people was always unconstitutional
and never appropriate, federal courts were divided prior to
Grutter and Gratz as to whether considerations of race were
appropriate in the context of remedial affirmative action by
government.
94 See id; see also Rice v Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
95 See Rice, 528 U.S. 495.
96 See Bishop Estate TAM, supra note 90.
97 In regard to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the IRS stated
that "[tihe Court in both cases, however, recognized that there would be situations
in which benefits to ethnic minorities would be appropriate to further compelling
governmental interests." See Bishop Estate TAM, supra note 90.
98 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1033 (1996).
99 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2002); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200-01 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
IV. RACIAL PREFERENCES BY PRIVATE TAX-EXEMPT SCHOOLS IN
LIGHT OF GRUTTER AND GRATZ
One of the most salient aspects of tax law's public policy
limitation is that a particular public policy must be clear and
established before it can be said to be an "established public
policy" that tax-exempt charities cannot violate. Prior to Grutter
and Gratz, the IRS took the position that race-conscious
affirmative action did not violate established public policy. Two
aspects of constitutional law supported this tax law position: the
split among the courts of appeals and the differences between
the Court's past treatment of invidious racial discrimination and
affirmative action by government.
The split among the courts of appeals on the issue of using
race as a factor in government affirmative action indicated that
it was highly unlikely that a court, or the IRS for that matter,
would conclude that there was a clear or established public
policy against race-conscious affirmative action. For example, in
the Fifth Circuit, race-conscious affirmative action was
absolutely prohibited by government. 100  Conversely, in the
Ninth Circuit, race-conscious affirmative action was permitted
by government. 10 1 Outside of these circuits, no clear guidance
existed. However, this state of affairs with respect to race-
conscious affirmative action was very different than the state of
affairs with respect to invidious discrimination against blacks
and other minorities. Indeed, invidious racial discrimination by
government has long been expressly prohibited. Thus, if tax
law's public policy standard is viewed as coexistent with the
constitutional law standard embodied in the Equal Protection
Clause, then prior to Grutter and Gratz it was clear that
invidious racial discrimination was contrary to "established
public policy." However, it was not "clear" that affirmative
action violated this same tax standard.
With the Court's recent decisions in Grutter and Gratz, the
state of affairs with respect to race-conscious affirmative action
has changed. It is now clear that race-conscious affirmative
action by government actors is permissible throughout the
United States. As the Supreme Court explained, race may be
used by government as one factor among many when providing
1o See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
101 See Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200-01.
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government benefits, 10 2 as long as race is not used as the
deciding factor.103 Whereas government entities in some circuits
were prohibited from using race, post-Grutter and post-Gratz, no
government entity in any circuit is now prohibited from properly
using race as a factor. Accordingly, the IRS is on even stronger
footing than before Grutter and Gratz in concluding that race-
conscious affirmative action is not prohibited by tax law's public
policy limitation. If the IRS continues to rely almost exclusively
on constitutional jurisprudence to decide the scope of the public
policy limitation, it should view the decision in Grutter as further
supporting its view that race-conscious affirmative action is
consistent with established public policy.
The IRS, however, is not necessarily bound to continue to
rely exclusively on constitutional law as the sole determinant of
what is and what is not a violation of established public policy.
First, the constitutional provision at issue in Grutter, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applies
directly to government actors, not private actors like tax-exempt
charities. Thus, while state colleges and universities are directly
bound to abide by the Court's constitutional decision in Grutter,
private colleges and universities are not. These private
institutions, however, may be indirectly affected by the Court's
decision in Grutter by virtue of statutory civil rights laws that
deny federal financial assistance to private entities that
discriminate based on race. 10 4 In many cases, racial preferences
that violate the Constitution may also violate civil rights laws.
However, the IRS has never before used violation of these civil
rights laws as the sole basis for denying or revoking a charity's
tax-exempt status.
Second, nothing in the Bob Jones University opinion
mandates that every act that the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional also violates the public policy limitation or vice
versa. Indeed, the Court in Bob Jones University did not
conclude that charities must comply with the Constitution.
Instead, it concluded that charities must comply with
"established public policy."10 5 As the Supreme Court's analysis in
Bob Jones University illustrates, a determination as to whether a
102 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338.
103 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427-28 (2003).
104 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
105 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
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particular act or policy violates "established public policy"
includes consideration of not only constitutional permissibility
but also other factors. 106 Thus, a decision that forbids any
consideration of race by government entities would not
necessarily equate with a public policy. This means that tax-
exempt entities that engage in the type of race-conscious decision
making undertaken by the University of Michigan in its
undergraduate admissions process may not violate established
public policy, even though such action would likely be
unconstitutional if engaged in by government actors.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the IRS has taken the position that the Supreme
Court's constitutional law decisions have a significant bearing on
whether race-conscious affirmative action policies violate tax
law's public policy limitation. Accordingly, Grutter and Gratz
provide a clear indication that the IRS will not soon deny or
revoke the tax-exempt status of charities that engage in the type
of race-conscious affirmative action engaged in by the University
of Michigan Law School. So long as a tax-exempt charity, a
private university for example, limits its use of race to being one
of many factors in making affirmative action decisions, the IRS
is unlikely to challenge the action as violative of "established
public policy."
The IRS, however, is not bound to continue viewing
constitutional law as determinative of what is, and is not,
"established public policy." Indeed, the IRS may consider factors
that do not stem from constitutional jurisprudence when
determining if a particular charity's race-conscious affirmative
action violates the public policy limitation. Conceptually, the
public policy limitation does not need to be co-extensive with the
totality of constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, the IRS might
properly conclude that the type of affirmative action the Court
invalidated in Gratz as unconstitutional might still be consistent
with established public policy if engaged in by a non-
governmental private tax-exempt actor. Based on such an
approach, the IRS could determine that, even though public
universities are prohibited from using race as a deciding factor of
admission, private universities are not necessarily prohibited
106 Id.
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from using race in this way. Such an approach would be entirely
consistent with Justice Powell's view of tax-exempt charities as
contributing to a "vigorous, pluralistic society" and not acting "on
behalf of Government in carrying out governmentally approved
policies."10 7
107 See id. at 609-10 (Powell, J. concurring). Justice Powell explains:
Even more troubling to me is the element of conformity that appears to
inform the Court's analysis. The Court asserts that an exempt
organization must "demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public
interest," must have a purpose that comports with "the common
community conscience," and must not act in a manner "affirmatively at
odds with [the] declared position of the whole government." Taken
together, these passages suggest that the primary function of a tax-exempt
organization is to act on behalf of the Government in carrying out
governmentally approved policies. In my opinion, such a view of §
501(c)(3) ignores the important role played by tax exemptions in
encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and
viewpoints. As Justice BRENNAN has observed, private, nonprofit groups
receive tax exemptions because "each group contributes to the diversity of
association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic
society." Far from representing an effort to reinforce any perceived
"common community conscience," the provision of tax exemptions to
nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of
governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life. Given the
importance of our tradition of pluralism, "[t]he interest in preserving an
area of untrammeled choice for private philanthropy is very great."
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